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Abstract
For feminists, a core goal is to promote the interests of women as a group. Across three studies, we examined whether the
pursuit of such goals can lead feminists to use more divergent thinking styles. We measured identification with feminists, iden-
tification with women, and manipulated the extent to which a divergent thinking task was congruent with the goal of promoting
women’s interests. Results showed that—when given the opportunity to promote the interests of women—feminist identifi-
cation was associated with greater divergent thinking. This effect was observed only in feminists who identified less strongly with
women as a group (“distinctive feminists”). We conclude that distinctive feminists draw on divergent thinking to promote the
interests of women as a group.
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Creativity is desirable across a range of contexts, from the
world of work, through industry and the arts, to education.
Across these domains, creativity not only leads to novel and
useful commercial products (Amabile, 1996) but it can also
build a fairer and more equal society. Indeed, oppression can
be a source of creativity, and some theorists have argued that
social inequality and disadvantage go hand in hand with crea-
tivity (Morley, 1995). This process can be seen, for instance, in
the use of art as a form of protest. Here, we build on the notion
that creativity can help people cope with low social status or
disadvantaged group memberships (Jackson et al., 1996). We
integrate insights from social identity theory and creativity psy-
chology to investigate whether members of a low-status group
use more creative approaches when acting on behalf of their
low-status in-group. We focus on the context of gender, specif-
ically on feminist women, and argue that some feminist women
deploy creativity when promoting women’s interests.
Creativity relies heavily on divergent thinking—the genera-
tion of multiple alternative solutions to open-ended problems
(Gocłowska et al., 2014). Divergent thinking includes the abil-
ity to switch between various approaches to problems (Nijstad
et al., 2010) and a tendency to deviate from established rules
and norms (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2007). Divergent thinking
is impeded by stereotypic thinking (Sassenberg & Moskowitz,
2005), and conversely, divergent thinking increases when
stereotypes and cognitive schemata are violated (Gocłowska
et al., 2014; Ritter et al., 2012). In other words, divergent
thinking requires the ability to diverge from established social
norms and expectations, and to imagine alternative realities. As
such, divergent thinking is a particularly powerful tool for
those looking to challenge social inequalities.
Social Creativity
The link between creativity and social inequality described
above is central to the literature on “social creativity.” This
research describes how members of disadvantaged groups use
creativity to address the low status position of the groups to
which they belong (Jackson et al., 1996; Tajfel & Turner,
1979). For instance, older gay men, having felt rejected by a
“youth oriented” gay culture, can positively reappraise their
age as “maturity” (Hajek, 2016). In this way, they divert atten-
tion away from the negative connotations of their age and rein-
terpret it more positively (Douglas et al., 2005). Although this
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does not involve creating novel solutions at the task level, it is
creative in the sense that people think about their identities in
ways that diverge from societal consensus. In sum, social crea-
tivity research recognizes that divergent thinking can be used to
manage low social status. However, until now, this literature
has explored only one way in which this happens: by reinter-
preting or redefining identities. Here, we draw on the
“functional creativity” literature to explore another way in
which members of disadvantaged groups may use divergent
thinking to empower their in-group.
Functional Creativity
Divergent thinking involves “defying the crowd” (Sternberg &
Lubart, 2002) and seeing problems from new perspectives (de
Dreu et al., 2011). As such, divergent thinking can help people
to overcome obstacles and challenges when pursuing important
goals (Roskes et al., 2012). Sligte et al. (2011) examined diver-
gent thinking in pursuit of goals related to social power. Their
work showed that when power relations are unstable, individu-
als in low power positions generate ideas in a more divergent
way, especially on tasks that allow them to demonstrate their
own suitability for positions of power. These findings are of
especial interest for the current work, as they demonstrate that
people use divergent thinking to address unequal social rela-
tionships. Here, we examine whether increases in divergent
thinking can similarly arise from the desire to empower one’s
in-group. Specifically, we examine whether feminists draw
on divergent thinking when pursuing the goal of empowering
women.
Identification With Feminists and Women
The reasoning above suggests that feminists are motivated to
empower women, and when they are presented with a task that
can achieve this goal, that motivation translates to more diver-
gent task approaches. This is consistent with previous evidence
that feminists value goals related to empowering women (e.g.,
Liss et al., 2004). Further, feminist identification predicts ten-
dencies to think about gender in nonnormative ways
(Henderson-King & Stewart, 1994; Mahalik et al., 2005). As
these nonnormative tendencies are related to increased diver-
gent thinking (Adarves-Yorno et al., 2007; Sassenberg & Mos-
kowitz, 2005), we expect a positive association between
feminist identification and divergent thinking on tasks that
empower women as a group.
However, feminist identification is not the only form of gen-
der identification that may have a bearing on divergent think-
ing. The consequences of feminist identification must be
analyzed in light of another identification dimension: identifi-
cation with women (van Breen et al., 2017). Women who are
strongly identified with women are more likely to use gender
stereotypes to describe themselves as individuals (van Breen
et al., 2017). As noted above, such adherence to social norms
and stereotypes impedes divergent thinking (Adarves-Yorno
et al., 2007). Based on this reasoning, we propose that when the
task offers the opportunity to empower women, divergent
thinking is strongest among women who are strongly identified
with feminists but who are less strongly identified with
women—whom previous research has called “distinctive fem-
inists” (van Breen et al., 2017). “Distinctive feminists” are
characterized by a certain freedom from essentialist concerns
about gender (associated with low identification with women)
as well as a strong motivation to empower women (associated
with high feminist identification). We argue that this translates
to greater divergent thinking on tasks that promote women’s
interests.
Overview of Current Research
Across three studies, we tested the hypothesis that feminist
identification is associated with greater divergent thinking on
tasks that promote a positive image of women, and that this
effect occurs specifically among those who report relatively
low identification with women. In all studies, divergent think-
ing was the dependent variable, and identification with femin-
ists and women were continuous predictors. In Studies 1 and 2,
we also manipulated the goal of the task as either promoting
women or promoting the self. Study 2 further examined an
alternative explanation for the central findings based on the
stereotype threat literature (Kaiser & Hagiwara, 2011). In
Study 3, we adapted the manipulation, so that both conditions
promote a positive image of women as a group but in either a
stereotypical or counter-stereotypical domain. Motivation and
gender essentialism were explored as possible mediators. All
study materials are included as part of Supplemental Materials.




The independent variables in Study 1 were identification with
women, identification with feminists, and a between-
participants manipulation with two levels. The manipulated
factor reflected framing of the instructions for the divergent
thinking task as either promoting a positive image of women
as a group or promoting a positive image of the self. The depen-
dent variable was divergent thinking.
Statistical Power and Participants
We aimed for a sample that would allow us to detect a small-to-
medium effect (d  .35) at 80% power, given a ¼ .05. Power
analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) suggested a sample
size of 264 participants. Accordingly, 264 female participants
were recruited. Age ranged from 18 to 67 years old (M ¼
29.6, SD ¼ 10.1). Twelve participants who participated twice
were excluded as well as eight participants who failed an atten-
tion check. We also excluded three multivariate outliers (Dra-
per & John, 1981; Gocłowska et al., 2019). Details on how the
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outliers were identified are given in the Supplemental Materi-
als. Excluding these participants left a final sample of 241
women. Sensitivity analysis showed that given, a ¼ .05 and
80% power, our sample of N ¼ 241 was able to detect effects
with an effect size of d  .36 or larger.
Independent Variables
Identification with women and feminists. Identification with
women was measured with 4 items (M ¼ 4.84, SD ¼ 0.95, a
¼ .85). The first item was Postmes et al.’s (2013) single-item
identification measure (“I identify with women”). The other
3 items were taken from the centrality subscale of Leach
et al.’s (2008) Identification Scale. These items were rated on
a 6-point Likert-type scale. Identification with feminists was
measured with the same 4 items (M ¼ 4.01, SD ¼ 1.43, a ¼
.97) with the word “feminists” replacing “women.” The corre-
lation between the two measures was r ¼ .31.
Manipulation: Group promotion versus self-promotion. We manipu-
lated the instructions for the divergent thinking task. Partici-
pants were introduced to a problem-solving task, without
mention of the term “creativity.” Half of our participants read
that good performance on the task would reflect positively on
them as individuals (self-promoting condition). The other half
of our participants read that good performance would reflect
positively on women as a group (group-promoting condition).
Dependent Variable: Divergent Thinking
The divergent thinking task (Guilford, 1971) asked participants
to list different uses for a brick within 4 minutes. The second
author and a second coder coded a subset of 584 (18%) ideas
into categories. Examples of categories include using the brick
as a construction material (“build a bridge”) or as a weapon
(“smash a window”). Agreement between the coders was good
(Cohen’s k ¼ .78), and any disagreements were resolved
through discussion. The remaining responses were then coded
by the second coder. The task yielded three indices: flexibility,
infrequency, and fluency. Flexibility (M ¼ 6.88, SD ¼ 2.74)
reflects the number of different categories a person draws on
in their answers. A person who draws on many different cate-
gories scores higher on flexibility than a person whose answers
all cluster within a single category. Infrequency (M ¼ 0.88, SD
¼ 0.04) reflects the originality of one’s ideas. For each cate-
gory a participant used, we calculated how often it occurred
in the data set. Categories that occur less frequently were
assigned higher infrequency scores. The infrequency scores
of all the participants’ answers were averaged to give a single
infrequency score per participant. Finally, fluency (M ¼ 12.14,
SD ¼ 5.12) reflects the total number of ideas generated.
In line with previous research (Gocłowska et al., 2014;
Gocłowska et al., 2019), the indices were checked for viola-
tions of normality. Fluency and flexibility were positively
skewed, and infrequency was negatively skewed (see Supple-
mental Materials); this was corrected through transformations.
We then standardized the resulting scores, so that they are rep-
resented on the same scale (Z-scores) to facilitate their combi-
nation into a single divergent thinking score. We derived the
divergent thinking score by averaging the standardized scores
for flexibility and infrequency (r ¼ .70, p < .001). High scores
on this variable reflect the generation of varied and original
ideas across a range of categories. Fluency was used as a cov-
ariate. The more ideas one generates, the more likely it is that
there will be divergent ideas among them (Simonton, 1997). As
such, controlling for fluency allowed us to examine divergent
thinking while controlling for the volume of responses gener-
ated (Ritter et al., 2012). Further details are given in the Sup-
plemental Materials.
Exploratory Variables
This study also included several exploratory variables to
explore possible mediators of the hypothesized effects. These
are described in the Supplemental Materials.
Procedure
Participants accessed the study through the Prolific platform.
After reading the study information and providing informed
consent participants completed two personality measures. The
presentation of the identification measures was counter-
balanced, so that half of the participants completed the mea-
sures of women’s and feminist identification before proceeding
to the divergent thinking task. The other half of the participants
went straight to the divergent thinking task and completed the
identification measures toward the end of the procedure. All
participants read the manipulated instructions for the divergent
thinking task1 before starting the task. After completing the
divergent thinking task, all participants filled in exploratory
measures and manipulation checks. At the end of the study,
those participants who had not done so already completed the
identification measures. Participants then provided demo-
graphic information before being debriefed and redirected to
the Prolific platform.
Results
We hypothesized that when identification with women is (rel-
atively) low, stronger feminist identification predicts greater
divergent thinking on tasks that are relevant to women as a
group. Indeed, the manipulation interacted with the identifica-
tion variables to affect divergent thinking, F(1, 241) ¼ 4.19, p
¼ .042, d ¼ .27. Please see Table 1 for parameter estimates.
The breakdown of this three-way interaction showed that when
identification with women was (relatively) low, stronger iden-
tification with feminists predicted increased divergent thinking
in the group-promoting condition, b ¼ .15, F(1, 241) ¼ 4.09, p
¼ .044, d ¼ .26, but not in the self-promoting condition, F < 1,
ns. These effects are illustrated in Figure 1.
There was no evidence that motivation or gender essential-
ism mediate this effect (see Supplemental Materials).
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Discussion of Study 1 and Introduction
to Study 2
Study 1 showed that when participants are given the opportu-
nity to promote women’s interests, stronger feminist identifica-
tion was associated with greater divergent thinking. This
pattern arose specifically when identification with women was
relatively low.
Given that the size of the central effect was smaller than
anticipated, we conducted a preregistered replication study
(www.osf.io/r689p). We expected that when identification with
women is (relatively) low, stronger feminist identification pre-
dicts greater divergent thinking on tasks that are relevant to
women as a group. We also explored an alternative explanation
of our findings, based on the stereotype threat literature. When
divergent thinking impacts women as a group, this might pro-
duce anxiety-driven decreases in divergent thinking perfor-
mance among other subgroups of women, rather than
increased divergent thinking among distinctive feminists (e.g.,
Kaiser & Hagiwara, 2011). To address this possibility, we
included a measure of performance anxiety. We also included




Study 2 was a direct replication of Study 1—the independent
variables, dependent variable, and design were the same as in
Study 1. The correlation between feminist identification (a ¼
.95, M ¼ 3.55, SD ¼ 1.35) and women’s identification (a ¼
.80, M ¼ 4.98, SD ¼ 0.83) was r ¼ .44.
Statistical Power and Participants
A priori power analysis showed that, given a ¼ .05 and 80%
power, a minimum sample of N ¼ 467 is needed to detect
an effect of the size identified in Study 1 (d ¼ .26). A total
of 512 women participated through the Prolific.ac platform.
Age ranged from 18 to 76 years old (M ¼ 37.4, SD ¼ 12.9).
Exclusions were applied in line with the preregistration. We
excluded one participant who identified as a man, as well as
Table 1. Parameter Estimates for the Full Model in Study 1.
Terms b estimate SE t Value p Value
95% CI
[Lower, Upper]
Fluency .52 .05 9.76 .000 [.41, .62]
ID women .06 .08 0.73 .465 [.21, .09]
ID feminist .06 .05 1.16 .249 [.04, .15]
Manipulation .01 .10 0.11 .915 [.18, .20]
ID Women  ID Feminist .09 .05 1.85 .065 [.19, .01]
Manipulation  ID Feminist .07 .07 1.07 .284 [.20, .06]
Manipulation  ID Women .06 .10 0.58 .560 [.14, .26]
Manipulation  ID Women  ID Feminist .14 .07 2.05 .042 [.01, .27]
Note. Divergent thinking is predicted by the manipulation (self-promotion vs. group promotion), identification with women, identification with feminists, and their
interactions, while controlling for fluency. Significant terms are highlighted in bold. ID ¼ identification.
Figure 1. The effect of identification with women, identification with feminists, and the manipulation on divergent thinking in Study 1. Note.
Divergent thinking scores (on the y-axis) are shown on a transformed and standardized scale and the mean values should not be interpreted
literally. Low and high identification are plotted at +1 standard deviation from the mean. The b estimate is given for the simple slope described
in the text.
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eight participants for whom English was not among their
native languages, and 13 participants who failed the atten-
tion check. We also excluded four multivariate outliers (see
Supplemental Materials). This left a final sample of 486
women.
Dependent Variable: Divergent Thinking
To arrive at the divergent thinking scores, the first author and
a second coder coded a subset of 574 (10%) of all ideas. Inter-
rater agreement was satisfactory (Cohen’s k ¼ .73). The sec-
ond coder then coded the rest of the ideas. We extracted scores
for infrequency (M ¼ 0.87, SD ¼ 0.04), flexibility (M ¼ 6.00,
SD ¼ 2.46), and fluency (M ¼ 10.18, SD ¼ 4.75). These
indices were treated the same way as in Study 1, in line with
established procedures (Gocłowska et al., 2014; Gocłowska
et al., 2019). As before, fluency and flexibility were positively
skewed and infrequency was negatively skewed (see Supple-
mental Materials), and transformations were applied. The
indices where then standardized, and a total divergent score
calculated. Further details are given in the Supplemental
Materials.
Exploratory Variables
Motivation and gender essentialism were measured in the same
way as in Study 1. We also included a measure of performance
anxiety. Participants were asked whether they experienced per-
formance anxiety during the divergent thinking task (4 items,
a ¼ .69), by responding to statements such as “I felt worried
about what my performance on the task might mean.” These
items were rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale.
Procedure
Participants accessed the study through the Prolific platform.
Participants read the study information and provided
informed consent. The presentation of the identification mea-
sures was counter-balanced, so that half of the participants
completed the measures of women’s and feminist identifica-
tion before going on to the divergent thinking task. The other
half of the participants went straight on to the divergent think-
ing task and completed the identification measures toward the
end of the procedure. All participants read the manipulated
instructions for the divergent thinking task before starting the
task. After completing the divergent thinking task,
Table 2. Parameter Estimates for the Full Model in Study 2.
Terms b estimate SE t Value p Value
95% CI
[Lower, Upper]
Fluency .55 .01 17.09 .000 [.49, .62]
ID women .05 .07 0.83 .410 [.08, .18]
ID feminist .01 .04 0.18 .856 [.08, .07]
Manipulation .15 .07 2.23 .027 [.29, .02]
ID Women  ID Feminist .05 .04 1.22 .223 [.03, .13]
Manipulation  ID Feminist .10 .05 1.85 .066 [.20, .01]
Manipulation  ID Women .20 .09 2.22 .027 [.02, .38]
Manipulation  ID Women  ID Feminist .13 .06 2.21 .028 [.01, .24]
Note. Divergent thinking is predicted by the manipulation (self-promotion vs. group promotion), identification with women, identification with feminists, and their
interactions, while controlling for fluency. Significant terms are highlighted in bold. ID ¼ identification.
Figure 2. The effect of identification with women, identification with feminists, and the manipulation on divergent thinking in Study 2. Note.
Divergent thinking scores (on the y-axis) are shown on a transformed and standardized scale and the mean values should not be interpreted
literally. Low and high identification are plotted at +1 standard deviation from the mean. The b estimate is given for the simple slope described
in the text.
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participants filled out the exploratory measures. Participants
who had not done so already then completed the identification
measures. At the end of the study, participants completed an
attention check and provided demographic information.
Finally, participants were debriefed and redirected to the Pro-
lific platform.
Results
We hypothesized that when identification with women is (rel-
atively) low, stronger feminist identification predicts greater
divergent thinking on tasks that are relevant to women as a
group. Indeed, there was a significant three-way interaction
between the manipulation and the identification variables,
F(1, 486) ¼ 4.89, p ¼ .028, d ¼ .20, as well as a number of
significant lower order terms, as shown in Table 2. Break-
down of this three-way interaction showed that, when identi-
fication with women was (relatively) low, stronger
identification with feminists predicted increased divergent
thinking in the group-promoting condition, b ¼ .16, F(1,
486) ¼ 9.01, p ¼ .003, d ¼ .28, but not the self-promoting
condition, F < 1, ns (see Figure 2). These findings support our
preregistered hypothesis.
Exploratory Analyses
The identification variables did not affect performance anxiety
(all terms F < 1, ns), but there was a marginal main effect of the
manipulation, F(1, 486) ¼ 3.32, p ¼ .069, such that the group-
promoting condition elicited somewhat higher performance
anxiety than the self-promoting condition. Therefore, we cre-
ated a mediation model (Hayes’s PROCESS Model 19; Hayes
& Preacher, 2013) where the manipulation predicts perfor-
mance anxiety, which subsequently interacts with feminist
identification and women’s identification to affect divergent
thinking. There was no evidence for this model: The indirect
effect did not reach significance, t < 1, and the direct effect
of the interaction described above remained significant,
t(486)¼ 2.25, p ¼ .025.
There was no evidence that motivation or gender essential-
ism mediated the central findings (see Supplemental Materials
for details).
Table 3. Parameter Estimates for the Full Model in Study 3.
Terms b Estimate SE t Value p Value
95% CI
[Lower, Upper]
Fluency .43 .05 9.21 .000 [.34, .52]
Manipulation .05 .09 0.49 .623 [.23, .14]
ID women .11 .15 0.69 .490 [.41, .19]
ID feminist .00 .11 0.002 .998 [.22, .22]
ID Women  ID Feminist .22 .10 2.20 .029 [.41, .02]
Manipulation  ID Feminist .03 .07 0.40 .690 [.11, .17]
Manipulation  ID Women .06 .10 0.55 .584 [.15, .26]
Manipulation  ID Women  ID Feminist .10 .07 1.51 .131 [.03, .24]
Note. Divergent thinking is predicted by the manipulation (stereotypical vs. counter-stereotypical domain), identification with women, identification with feminists,
and their interactions, while controlling for fluency. Significant terms are highlighted in bold. ID ¼ identification.
Figure 3. The effect of identification with women and identification with feminists in Study 3. Note. When interpreting the figure, please note
that divergent thinking scores (on the y-axis) are shown on a transformed and standardized scale and the mean values should not be interpreted
literally. Low and high identification are plotted at +1 standard deviation from the mean. The b estimate is given for the simple slope described
in the text.
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Discussion of Study 2 and Introduction
to Study 3
Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1. In the group-
promoting condition, stronger feminist identification predicted
greater divergent thinking, among women who were less
strongly identified with women. This study additionally
explored performance anxiety as an alternative explanation for
our findings but no evidence for this alternative was found.
We conducted Study 3 to provide a conceptual replication of
Studies 1 and 2. Study 3 also explored an additional factor that
may contribute to these findings, which is the domain that a task
refers to. The divergent thinking task refers to a brick, which has
masculine connotations of building and construction. Therefore,
the task may be interpreted as presenting women positively in a
counter-stereotypic domain—which might be particularly
appealing to distinctive feminists. To explore this issue, we cre-
ated a manipulation that consisted of two conditions, which both
promoted a positive image of women, either in a gender-
stereotypic domain or in a counter-stereotypic domain.
Given that both conditions present a positive image of
women, we expected that—across conditions—stronger femin-
ist identification should predict greater divergent thinking, par-
ticularly when identification with women is (relatively) low.
Additionally, we explore whether this effect is stronger when
the task is framed as counter-stereotypic.
Method
Design
The independent variables in this study were identification with
women, identification with feminists and a between-
participants manipulation with two conditions. The manipu-
lated factor reflected framing of the instructions for the
divergent thinking task in a counter-stereotypical versus stereo-
typical way. Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, in both conditions, the
task was relevant to the goal of promoting women. The depen-
dent variable was divergent thinking.
Statistical Power and Participants
In Studies 1 and 2, the central effect arose from a three-way
interaction between the group- versus self-relevance manipula-
tion, identification with women, and identification with femin-
ists. In this study, however, both levels of the manipulation
framed the task as promoting women, and therefore, the effect
of central interest should now arise from the two-way interaction
between the identification variables. Power analysis indicated
that, given a ¼ .05, 366 participants were needed to detect an
effect of d¼ .26 with 80% power. Moreover, we were interested
in a possible three-way interaction involving the new manipula-
tion (stereotypical vs. counter-stereotypical framing) but the size
of this effect was not known. Therefore, we kept our intended
sample size at N ¼ 366; which allowed us to detect a three-
way interaction if the effect size were at least d ¼ .29.
Unfortunately, the intended sample size (N ¼ 366) was not
reached due to practical constraints. A total of 303 female par-
ticipants participated in this study. Age ranged from 18 to 72
years old (M ¼ 37.6, SD ¼ 12.8). As in Studies 1 and 2, we
excluded five people who did not list English among their
native languages. Three participants were excluded because
they failed the attention check. Another two were excluded
as multivariate outliers. For more information on the outliers,
please refer to Supplemental Materials. The final sample con-
sisted of 293 participants. This sample can detect an effect size
of d ¼ .33 with 80% power.
Independent variables
Identification with women and feminists. Identification with
women (a ¼ .86, M ¼ 4.60, SD ¼ 0.95) and identification with
feminists (a ¼ .95, M ¼ 3.22, SD ¼ 1.35) were measured as
before (r ¼ .30).
Manipulation. The key difference between this Study and Stud-
ies 1 and 2 lies in the manipulation. We dropped the self-
promoting condition and created two conditions that both
allowed women to promote a positive image of the group.
However, the conditions differed in the framing the divergent
thinking task, the task was described as either gender stereo-
typic or counter-stereotypic. In the stereotypic condition, par-
ticipants read that good performance would demonstrate
women’s suitability for “social professions, which are gener-
ally considered feminine.” In the counter-stereotypic condi-
tion, participants read that good performance would
demonstrate women’s suitability for “technical professions,
which are generally considered masculine.” This manipula-
tion aimed to provide insight into whether or not divergent
thinking is triggered specifically when the task conveys com-
petence in a counter-stereotypical domain.
Dependent Variable: Divergent Thinking
Divergent thinking scores were calculated as before, in line
with past research (Gocłowska et al., 2014; Gocłowska
et al., 2019). Two coders assigned a random subset of 300
(10%) of all the ideas to categories. Interrater agreement was
very good (Cohen’s k ¼ .96), any disagreements were
resolved through discussion. We extracted three indices: flu-
ency (M ¼ 9.96, SD ¼ 4.46), flexibility (M ¼ 6.15, SD ¼
2.39), and infrequency (M ¼ 0.88, SD ¼ .03). As before, flu-
ency and flexibility were positively skewed, and infrequency
was negatively skewed (see Supplemental Materials), and
transformations were applied. The indices were standardized,
and a total divergent thinking score was derived using the
same procedure as in Studies 1 and 2.
Exploratory Variables
As in Study 2, participants were asked to indicate whether they
experienced performance anxiety during the divergent thinking
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task (4 items, a ¼ .76). We also include motivation, gender
essentialism, and personal need for structure as exploratory
variables, these are described in the Supplemental Materials.
Procedure
Participants accessed the study through the Prolific platform,
read the study information, and provided informed consent.
They then provided demographic information. Subsequently,
participants read the manipulated instructions for the divergent
thinking task. After completing the divergent thinking task,
participants completed the attention checks and the exploratory
measures (see Supplemental Materials). Subsequently, partici-
pants indicated their identification with women and their iden-
tification with feminists. Finally, participants were debriefed
and redirected to Prolific.
Results
We hypothesized that distinctive feminists rely on divergent
thinking more than other women do. Indeed, the interaction
between identification with women and identification with fem-
inists predicted divergent thinking scores, t(293) ¼ 2.20, p ¼
.029, d ¼ .38. More specifically, when identification with
women was (relatively) low, stronger identification with femin-
ists predicted greater divergent thinking, b ¼ .12, t(293)¼ 2.29,
p¼ .023, d¼ .27. This effect is represented in Figure 3. Table 3
gives the parameter estimates for the full model.
In addition, we examined the effect of the (new) manipula-
tion, which described the divergent thinking task as conveying
either stereotypical or counter-stereotypical attributes. The
central effect did not seem to be qualified by the manipulation,
t(293) ¼ 1.51, p ¼ .131. That is, there was no evidence that the
stereotypic versus counter-stereotypic framing of the task
impacted the results.
Exploratory Analyses
There were no effects of the identification variables or the
manipulation on performance anxiety, either as main effects
or in interaction, Fs < 1, ns. Similarly, there was no evidence
that motivation or gender essentialism mediated these effects
(see Supplemental Materials).
Discussion
Study 3 replicated Studies 1 and 2, showing that distinctive
feminists draw on divergent thinking more than other groups
of women do (when good performance reflected positively
on women as a group). Although power in this study fell short
of 80%, we are confident in the robustness of this finding given
its replication across studies, and the similarity of the effect
size in each case. Additionally, the three studies reported here
are the only research we have conducted on the link between
feminist identification and divergent thinking. Similar to Study
2, Study 3 found no evidence that the effect of the identification
variables on divergent thinking was due to performance
anxiety. Finally, this study found no support for the possibility
that the perceived counter-stereotypical (vs. stereotypical)
nature of creativity explains the observed effect. This suggests,
perhaps, that distinctive feminists are motivated by a general
desire to present a positive image of the group, rather than spe-
cifically pursuing counter-stereotypic attributes. However, it is
difficult to interpret null effects, especially given power con-
cerns, and as such this issue requires further research.
General Discussion
Across three studies, we demonstrated that distinctive feminists
engage in greater divergent thinking when good task perfor-
mance reflects positively on women as a group. This work inte-
grates insights from the functional creativity and social creativity
literatures and makes an interesting contribution to each of these
literatures. First, social creativity research has long recognized
that people use divergent thinking to challenge low social status
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, until now, this literature has
explored only one way in which this happens—by reinterpreting
or redefining identities. Here, we identify another way in which
creativity can be used to address identity concerns, namely by
facilitating the pursuit of group-related goals. Second, these find-
ings extend research on divergent thinking. Previous studies
demonstrated that the pursuit of important goals prompts greater
divergent thinking (e.g., Roskes et al., 2012; Sligte et al., 2011).
Here, we show that divergent thinking is similarly triggered by
the pursuit of group-relevant goals.
Note that we do not argue that distinctive feminists performed
better on the task. The instructions for the divergent thinking task
asked participants to generate as many uses as possible for a
brick. So, from the participant’s perspective, high fluency would
be the desired outcome. As such, the crucial difference does not
lie in what participants do but rather in how they do it. Distinc-
tive feminists, more than other women, employed a divergent
thinking style to achieve the aim of the task. Because we focus
on task approaches rather than task performance, these findings
provide novel insights that complement previous studies exam-
ining the effects of gender identity on performance (e.g., Bry
et al., 2008; Inzlicht et al., 2006).
It is worth considering the mechanism underlying these
effects. Above, we argued that the desire to empower women
is an important goal among feminists (relative to nonfeminists),
which suggests a role for motivation in the underlying mechan-
ism. Aside from the motivation to engage with the task, the
underlying mechanism is likely to also include an aspect of how
people engage with the task. There is evidence that feminists—
and particularly feminists who are not strongly committed to
women as a group—are less concerned about gendered norms
and prescriptions (Henderson-King & Stewart, 1994; Mahalik
et al., 2005) or indeed want to confound them, and as such are
more free to draw on unconventional and creative strategies.
Based on this reasoning, we considered motivation and gender
essentialism as mediators of the central effects, but there was
no consistent evidence for this. The reasons for this may be in
part methodological. For instance, we conceptualized motivation
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as “motivation to do well on the task” but it is possible that dis-
tinctive feminists’ motivation is not a general motivation to do
well but a more specific kind of motivation, for instance, to
demonstrate traits associated with power and status. In other
words, perhaps our measure of motivation was not specific
enough. We might also consider possible mediators aside from
motivation and gender essentialism. One possibility is that
among distinctive feminists, situations that promote women acti-
vate a “feminist norm” that encourages the rejection of stereoty-
pic and schematic thinking. The rejection of stereotypic and
schematic thinking is associated with more divergent thinking
(Goclowska et al., 2014; Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005). In
other words, perhaps distinctive feminists show greater creativ-
ity on behalf of women because they adhere to a certain
“feminist norm” that encourages nonnormative behavior.
Conclusion
Across three studies, we demonstrated that the opportunity to
promote a positive image of women as a group drives creativ-
ity. Specifically, when identification with women is low, iden-
tification with feminism is associated with greater creativity on
behalf of women. These findings extend our knowledge of the
strategies that members of disadvantaged groups use to
empower their in-group. Further, these findings support the
observation—from popular culture and social–psychological
theory—that identity and creativity are closely linked.
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Note
1. Prior to the group- versus self-promotion manipulation, we also
manipulated stereotype versus counter-stereotype exposure but this
manipulated factor did not produce any effects on later measures.
For the sake of brevity, this manipulation is further omitted, though
we did establish that it does not affect the central results reported in
the text. Details can be found in the Supplemental Materials.
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